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Abstract 
Most studies on tactical voting in proportional representation system focus on voting to help a 
party pass the threshold to the parliament. This study extends and develops the definition of 
tactical voting. The theoretical starting point is the rational choice theory of Anthony Downs 
(1957), who discusses voters’ strategic considerations in elections. From Downs’s perspective 
the rational voter considers the governmental consequences of voting. Downs distinguishes 
general rational voting, oriented towards the next-coming formation of government, from 
future oriented rational voting. This distinction is developed in the study, and tested on a 
contemporary electoral context. The specific case investigated is the 2010 Swedish general 
election. Tactical voting is defined as voting where party tactical considerations have decided 
vote choice. Among Swedish voters seven variants of tactical voting are identified. Five of 
these are short term: impact-voting, government-voting, relationship-voting, big party-voting 
and pass-the-threshold-voting, whereas two types are future oriented: signaling-voting and 
diversity-voting. In an explanatory analysis tactical voting is found to be related to hesitation 
about what party to choose and to young age.  
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1. Intro: The electoral arena 
Some voters vote for another party than the one they like most. One reason could be the 
specific party context. What are the relationships between parties? Does the favorite party 
have a chance to become influential? Which other parties are entering the election? Such 
tactical considerations may make the voter switch vote intentions. This thesis will investigate 
tactical aspects of voting.  
The theoretical starting point is the rational choice theory of Anthony Downs (1957). From 
this perspective, voting is seen as a rational decision process. The voter is furthermore 
assumed to take the governmental consequences into account when voting. From this view it 
is the outcome of voting that is important, rather than expressing one’s first political 
preference. Therefore some voters may choose another party than the favorite one. Downs 
also discusses why some voters vote rational, whereas others stay loyal with first party 
preference. Downs’s theory will be tested on a contemporary electoral context.  
First of all, the thesis will theoretically define what voting motives should be considered as 
tactical. The motives will be related to the specific party-system and expected governmental 
outcome. Furthermore, short-term tactical considerations will be distinguished from future 
oriented tactical motives. Moreover a distinction between tactical considerations and strict 
tactical voting will be developed. Tactical considerations may influence even those who stay 
with first party preference, whereas for others tactical factors lead to switching parties. The 
latter will be defined as strict tactical voting.  
The specific case that will be examined is the 2010 Swedish general election. This election 
provided many alternatives; there were larger parties, smaller parties and a couple of 
outsiders. Furthermore, the parliamentary parties entered the election as two main government 
coalitions. This made the election resemble plurality rule system, and enhanced the possibility 
to use different sorts of tactical reasoning.  Most research on tactical voting in proportional 
representation system focuses on voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament. 
This thesis will extend and develop the definition of tactical voting.  
In  an explanatory part of the study, the relationship between in previous research found 
different individual characteristics and tactical voting will also be tested.  
In sum this will generate knowledge on voters’ motives and behavior in a contemporary 
electoral context. This is a relevant subject to study not at least because voters are becoming 
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more volatile (van der Eijk & Franklin 2009). For some of these tactical aspects may play an 
important role.  
2. Theoretical perspective 
2.1 Rational voting 
Most research on tactical voting starts from a rational choice perspective (Ordeshook & Zeng 
1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Kselman & Niou 2010:2). From this view, it is the outcome of 
the election that is voters’ focus, rather than expressing a first political preference. The 
pioneer Anthony Downs (1957) develops a theory of voting from this perspective. He sees 
strategic considerations as a logical part of a rational voter’s decision process. To consider 
strategic aspects there has to be more than two alternatives: then it might be a reason to 
support the second party preference. The base for voting is ideological, according to Downs: 
the voter assesses the benefits each party will provide. Sometimes this score is combined with 
a judgment of the party’s performance in recent term in office (Downs 1957:41). Then, 
strategic aspects will be taken into account (ibid. p 47). If the favorite party has no chances to 
get elected the rational voter will tend to choose the second preference, given it is more 
competitive. For some voters, the two most preferred parties are seen as almost as good. 
These voters will tend to switch parties to a larger extent than those whose party preferences 
are clearer, Downs argues (ibid. p 49). The tendency to switch will also depend on whether 
there is a party the voter dislikes very much. Then there is an extra incentive to choose a more 
competitive party, to hinder the disliked alternative from getting influence. The tendency to 
shift parties will according to Downs also depend on the temperament of the voter (ibid. p 
48).  
There has been considerably consensus on the basics of voters’ strategic considerations 
Downs discusses (Heath & Evans 1994; Ordeshook & Zeng 1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). 
However, there are some aspects of rational voting that are less investigated. This thesis will 
develop these.  
2.2 Future oriented rationality 
Downs also discusses that the rational voter may be future oriented. For these voters, it could 
be a reason to vote for an overall less preferred party if the voter dislikes the development of 
the favorite party, and wants to send a warning to it (Downs 1957:49). There could also be a 
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reason to vote for a small, uncompetitive party if the voter wants a more diverse selection of 
government later on, Downs argues (ibid.).  
Downs is very brief in the description of future oriented rational voting, and few have picked 
up the arguments on this kind of voting. When similar voting is discussed, it is often under the 
more general label protest voting (Heath & Evans 1994; Kang 2004; van der Eijk & Franklin 
2009:131). Protest-voting is often argued to be related to general disaffection and 
indifference. Thus protest-voting should not be regarded as the same phenomenon as the 
future oriented rational voting Downs describes. The important distinction between future 
oriented rational voting and general protest voting should be that the former is targeted and 
takes the long term consequences of voting into account, whereas the latter is a more diffuse 
sign of disaffection.  
Some scholars though discuss protest-voting resembling of Downs’s view of future oriented 
rational voting (Kang 2004; Kselman & Niou 2010:1). Kselman and Niou (2010:1) defines 
protest-voting as 
“choosing a party other than one’s most preferred one to send that most 
preferred party a signal of dissatisfaction.”   
In line with Downs, Kselman and Niou develop an analysis from a rational choice 
perspective. They analyze this sort of signaling voting in cost-benefit-terms, i.e. as voting 
related to  a rational decision calculus.   The value of signaling-voting depends, according to 
these authors, on the improvement the favorite party is supposed to make if the voter sends a 
signal to it. Another aspect taken into account is the weight the voter gives to influencing the 
long term development of the favorite party, versus affecting the next-coming formation of 
government. If the benefits of signaling-voting are considered higher than the benefits of 
voting for first party preference, targeted protest voting is rational according to these authors.  
Another contemporary scholar, Kang (2004), develops a similar rational choice influenced 
reasoning. Kang compares targeted protest-voting with abstention. As Kselman and Niou, 
Kang argues that the value of a signal of disaffection could be calculated in a cost-benefit-
analysis. Targeted protest voting requires an alternative attractive enough to signal vote for, 
according to Kang. There is thus supposed to be some kind of appeal in the more targeted 
variant of protest-voting.  
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However, it is questionable that the value of signaling-voting could be calculated the way 
Kselman and Niou and Kang suggest. First of all, it should be very difficult to assess what 
improvement the most preferred party will make if sending a message to it. Kselman and 
Niou briefly discuss the importance of the degree of information parties’ have on voters’ 
motives. Reasonably the parties lack information on voters’ motives, why signals of 
disaffection should be difficult for parties to interpret.  It is also doubtful that voters consider 
parties’ coming improvement when thinking about whether to signaling-vote or not. Rather, 
future oriented rational voting should be the result of a mental rationality. The voter wishes 
that the favorite party will improve if sending a message to it – therefore the action becomes 
rational for the specific voter.  
Still, in the aggregate such signals of disaffection may have an impact on the electoral 
outcome; the effect of a warning-message to a party should be more forceful if many voters 
articulate it. Therefore future oriented signaling voting could still be rational from a more pure 
rational choice perspective, if the voter co-ordinate the signaling-behavior with other voters.
1
 
2.3 Voting under coalition governments 
The base for Downs’s analysis on rational voting is plurality systems, where only one party 
takes the seat (winner takes all). These electoral systems often results in one-party 
government.  In systems with coalition governments, rational voting becomes more 
complicated. Here rational voters should take the favorite party’s coalition partners into 
account when voting, Downs argues (1957:146). If the favorite party co-operates with a 
disliked party, it may be rational to choose another one. Since governmental alternatives are 
often blurred it is though difficult to take strategic aspects into account, Downs puts forward.  
Therefore voters in coalition government systems tend to behave irrationally from Downs’s 
point of view, i.e. not consider strategic aspects at all (Downs 1957:154). Downs though 
admits that for a specific voter this behavior could still be rational (ibid.).  
There is thus a reservation with the view of rationality used in the rational voting theory. 
Downs’s view of rational voting is first of all related to systemic aspects, not to the individual 
voter.  For many voters in unclear systems it should, as Downs also admits, be rational and 
cost-saving not to take strategic aspects into account. If it is too complicated and impossible 
to assess the outcome, such considerations could be seen as pointless and confusing. 
                                                          
1
 The view of aggregate rationality holds true for short term rational voting as well. The chances that a single 
vote will affect the outcome are exceptionally small. Though, in the aggregate tactical votes could have a real 
impact. 
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However, if governmental alternatives are clear, it is easier for voters to consider strategic 
aspects, Downs argues (1957:147). If the rules of the game are clear, it becomes less costly to 
consider governmental outcome, and might be rational to do so for even from the individual’s 
point of view.  
2.4 Summary: rational voting in theory 
From Downs’s perspective, rational voting is to take the governmental consequences into 
account when voting. The voter therefore has to consider the specific party context. Strategic 
considerations could be short-term, focusing on the next-coming formation of government, or 
long term, related to a wished development of a favorite party or diversity in the party system.  
The prerequisites for rational voting are clearer in plurality systems, where only one party gets 
the seat. Under coalition governments strategic thinking could also be related to close inter-
relationships between parties. If the governmental alternatives are clear, it is easier to vote 
rationally in these systems, according to Downs. 
3. Previous research 
3.1 Definitions of tactical voting 
Most research on tactical voting is influenced by Downs’s view of rational voting. Most 
scholars furthermore start from the view that tactical voting is to vote for another party than 
the first party preference (Holmberg 1984, Gilljam & Holmberg 1990; 1993; Ordeshook & 
Zeng 1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Alvarez et al. 2006). Holmberg (1984:41) defines tactical 
voting as  
“consciously voting for another party than one’s most preferred one to attain a 
specific political goal.” 2 
The most well-known example of tactical voting in proportional representation system is 
voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament (see sect. 3.2). Within Holmberg’s 
definition, several political motives could however be included. Some voters might for 
example vote for another party than the most preferred one due to disliked candidates in the 
favorite party.  From Downs’s point of view, it is the party context and the governmental 
consequences that is central in rational voting. A specific candidate could hardly influence the 
                                                          
2
 “Medvetet rösta på ett annat parti än sitt bästa för att därmed nå ett visst politiskt syfte.” (Holmberg 
1984:41) 
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composition of government. Therefore candidate-voting should not be included in a more 
restrictive definition of tactical voting.  A refined definition of Holmberg’s, more in line with 
Downs’s perspective, could be 
“consciously voting for another party than the most preferred one to attain a 
specific governmental outcome.” 
The view of tactical voting as voting for another party than the most preferred one could also 
be confronted. For example van der Brug et al. (2007:51) argue that tactical thinking is 
incorporated in voters thinking of parties, and the propensity to support them. From this point 
of view it could be argued that some voters support a party because it is big. Alternatively, 
some voters might favor a small party because it is small. Thus it is not evident that voters 
who consider tactical aspects choose another party than the first preference. This makes it 
relevant to talk about degrees of tactical voting (figure 1): 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
non-tactical                        tactical considerations                                                  strict tactical 
(figure 1) 
 
First, there is some voting that is not influenced by tactical considerations at all (non-tactical 
voting). Then there is voting influenced by tactical aspects, such as the size of the party, to 
some extent (tactical considerations).  At the far right is the most exclusive definition of 
tactical voting: that is voting for another preference than the first one, due to tactical 
considerations (strict tactical voting).  It is though reasonable to define tactical voting in a 
somewhat broader sense. If the voter’s preferences for two most preferred parties are tied, and 
tactical aspects make the voter chose one of these parties, the voting should be seen as 
tactical.  
To conclude, an elaborated definition of tactical voting could be 
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“consciously voting for another party than the most preferred one (or an equally 
preferred one), to attain a specific governmental outcome.”  
 
This definition will be the theoretical starting-point for the forthcoming empirical 
investigation. Central features are the specific party system and the expected governmental 
consequences of voting.  
3.2 Tactical considerations 
Many scholars have applied Downs’s reasoning on strategic considerations in voting on 
contemporary electoral contexts. Most studies investigate voters’ tendency to abandon the 
most preferred party for a more competitive one (Niemi et al. 1992; Ordeshook & Zeng 1997; 
Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Kselman & Niou 2010:2). Fewer discuss future oriented rational 
voting and voting under coalition governments. Some studies have discovered future oriented 
tactical motives inductively. In a study of the British plurality system, Franklin et al. (1994) 
find out that some voters who refer to tactical motives have voted for small uncompetitive 
parties. They interpret this as voters’ wish to signal a direction, and label the voting 
expressive tactical. In a proportional representation context, Gilljam and Holmberg (1990; 
1993) find similar tendencies. They discover that  a part of the supporters of some minor 
parties, for example the Green Party, in Swedish elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
were not sincere supporters of these parties, but declared another party as their favorite (ibid.). 
Gilljam and Holmberg interpret this as voters wish to see another direction in a certain issue, 
and label the voting issue oriented tactical (saktaktisk) (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:291).  
There has also been some research on tactical voting specific for proportional representation 
system and coalition governments. A characteristic of PR-systems is the threshold to the 
parliament, which generates motives to vote for small parties near the threshold. For example 
small parties may function as coalition partners to larger parties, why it could be a reason for 
supporters of the larger one to vote for the minor party. In line with this reasoning, Gilljam 
and Holmberg label voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament party tactical 
(partitaktisk) (ibid.). They mean that pass-the-threshold voting could be a tool to strengthen 
(the politics of) the larger party.  On the other hand, voting for a small party within a 
governmental coalition could also be a sign of a wished direction to the larger party. It could 
furthermore be a reason to support a party near the threshold to get a more diverse selection of 
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government later on. In these cases the tactical pass-the threshold voting is thus more future 
oriented. It is pass the threshold voting most research on tactical voting in PR-systems refers 
to (Holmberg 1984; Tsbelis 1986; Holmberg 2000; Oscarsson & Holmberg 2008). In Sweden 
it is sometimes labeled “comrade four per cent” (kamrat fyra procent), referring to the 
threshold to the parliament (and historically to Social Democratic supporters voting for the 
considerably smaller Left party (see Holmberg 1984:45)).
 
 
Many studies have also looked at how widespread tactical voting is. In plurality systems, the 
percentage varies considerably. If all voters are included around 6–8 per are estimated to vote 
tactically (Heath et al. 1994; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). If future oriented tactical voting in a 
broad sense is included in the analysis the percentage is about twice as high, according to 
Franklin et al. (1994).  In the Swedish proportional representation system, the percentage 
tactical pass-the-threshold voters is about 1 per cent, according to self-reported answers 
(Holmberg 2000:112). Pass-the-threshold-voting is however a very narrow definition of 
tactical voting.  
3.3 Explaining tactical voting 
Some studies also try to explain the presence of tactical voting.  Most studies confirm 
Downs’s arguments on the importance of the composition of party preferences. In plurality 
system, tactical voting is related to small chances for the favorite party to be elected, 
indifference between the two most preferred parties and low party identification (Niemi et al. 
1992; Franklin et al. 1994; Heath & Evans 1994; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). Some studies from 
the Swedish proportional system show that tactical voting is more common among voters who 
have switched parties from one election to the other, i.e. volatile voters (Holmberg 2000:112). 
In Sweden tactical voting is also found to be slightly related to education, political interest 
and knowledge (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:292). 
3.4 Contribution of the study 
Previous research on tactical voting in the Swedish system in general focuses on pass-the-
threshold voting. On the other hand, there is no systematic investigation of what different 
kinds of tactical considerations voters use. This thesis will fill this gap. The study will test 
Downs’s (1957) theory of rational voting on a contemporary PR-context. It will see if the 
tactical considerations Downs discuss are present among voters. Furthermore, the study will 
test individual characteristics related to tactical voting.  
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3.5 Research questions 
What kinds of party tactical considerations are present among voters in a contemporary PR-
system? 
Are there both short term and future oriented tactical considerations? 
Which individual characteristics are related to tactical voting? 
 
4 Empirical investigation 
4.1 Case: Sweden 
A clear example of a complicated and changing party strategic situation in proportional 
representation electoral systems is Sweden.  Here the Social Democratic party was for long 
the dominant government party, but the last decade the bourgeois parties have challenged this 
position.  At the prospect of the 2006 election, the four bourgeois parties for the first time 
outspokenly and closely co-operated in “the Alliance”, aiming at getting into office. This was 
successful: the Alliance succeeded in winning the election. Approaching the 2010 election the 
bourgeoisie parties stayed with the Alliance, whereas the Social Democrats for the first time 
co-operated with the Green party and the Left party in another government alternative, “the 
Red-Greens”.  In a Swedish perspective, this was an extraordinary clear government 
alternative situation. From Downs’s perspective, this could be argued to encourage strategic 
considerations. It could lead to 
1) voting for any of the parties within the main government alternatives, to make the vote 
count (short-term tactical voting)
 3
  
2) signal oriented voting , if the voter disliked the favorite party’s recent development 
(future oriented tactical voting) 
Therefore the Swedish general election 2010 is an interesting case to investigate in regard to 
tactical voting. There are three main reasons to choose this election as the specific case. The 
main reason is that it provided many different opportunities to vote tactically: there were 
larger and smaller parliamentary parties, as well as a couple of outsiders, and proposed 
                                                          
3 This was in fact encouraged by Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and minister of finance Anders Borg, 
who late in the election campaign encouraged the Swedes to vote for a stable Alliance government, to keep the 
xenophobic party Sweden Democrats out of influence (DN 101124). This is not a unique Swedish phenomenon: 
parties tend to emphasize strategic factors in election campaigns (van der Eijk & Franklin 2009:106). 
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government coalitions. It should therefore be possible to study different sorts of tactical 
considerations. The second reason is that this election is a recent example. This could reveal 
trends. The third reason is pragmatic: there was available, relevant individual level data from 
the 2010 election.  
4.2 Data 
The data for the study comes from the 2010 Internet Campaign panel (E-panelen) in the 2010 
Swedish general election, conducted within the Multidisciplinary research on Opinion and 
Democracy institute (MOD), University of Gothenburg. This election study is an Internet 
based citizen-panel with five sequential questionnaires, four pre-election and one post-
election. They were conducted the four weeks before and the week directly after the general 
election in 19 September 2010 (weeks 34–38). About 14 000 respondents were recruited, of 
which 4300 participated in all surveys (Dahlberg et al. 2011). The questionnaires for each 
week of the panel contained several questions on political attitudes and thoughts about the 
general election. At each stage, the respondent got a part of the questions. That means that 
some respondents got one question one week, while others got the same question the week 
before or after.
4
 The panel is self-recruited 
5
 and males, relatively young people with high 
education and high political interest in urban areas are over-represented (Nilsson et al. 2007; 
Dahlberg et al. 2011). In the 2010 panel, supporters for the largest parties, the Social 
Democrats and the Moderate Party, were underrepresented (Dahlberg et al. 2011). This is 
beneficiary for this study in the sense that supporters for smaller parties are represented. 
Future oriented tactical voting should therefore have a chance to be revealed. Furthermore, in 
a complicated PR-context, tactical voting is supposed to be somewhat more widespread 
among politically sophisticated voters. Therefore different kinds of tactical considerations 
should have a chance to be present in this sample. Moreover the sample is large: 1746 
respondents answered the question relevant for the dependent variable. This increases the 
generalizability of the study. Of course there could be ways of reasoning tactically that have 
not been covered, but the size and character of the sample should strengthen the 
generalizability. The explanatory part of the study should be somewhat less representative, 
since individual characteristics are more influential. Still, important background factors such 
                                                          
4
 Some questions were only given to a part of the respondents. Therefore the sample varies in the forthcoming 
explanatory analyses.  
5
 via for example Internet sites and local morning papers 
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as age and education vary in the panel. The explanatory part will make it possible to reveal 
tendencies, which could be tested in future research.   
4.3 Dependent variable: tactical considerations 
Many studies on tactical voting use voters’ self-reported answers on reasons to vote for a 
party as a measurement of tactical voting (see e.g. Niemi et al. 1992). This thesis will start 
from this perspective, as it aims at discovering different kinds of tactical reasoning. As a 
second step, this method will be complemented with elements from another tradition in 
tactical voting research, which compares voters’ party preference with vote or vote intention 
(Gilljam and Holmberg 1990; 1993; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). If the voter votes (or intend to 
vote) for another party than the first party preference, the vote is considered as tactical. A 
critique against using this method uniquely is that there are other reasons than party tactical 
ones to vote for another party than the first preference, for example certain candidates, 
random or trends. In this thesis the comparison between party preference and vote is on the 
other hand combined with self-reported voting motivations, which strengthens the coding of a 
vote as tactical. 
The open-ended question that was analyzed to reveal tactical considerations in the first step is 
the following question in the post-election stage of the panel: 
Why did you vote the way you did in the 2010 Swedish general election?
6
 
This question makes is possible to mention different kinds of reasons, such as tactical aspects. 
The participants answered the question the week immediately after the general election, which 
is very beneficiary for the study: responses on open-ended questions related to voting decision 
tend to be more valid the closer to the election they are given (Alvarez & Nagler 2000).  The 
initial coding of an answer as tactical is rather inclusive: if tactical considerations are 
mentioned to have influenced the final vote to some extent, the answer is coded as tactical. A 
reason for this inclusive categorization is that tactical voting according to previous studies is 
very rare in PR-systems (Holmberg 2000:112). This implies that some kinds of tactical 
reasoning among voters may have been uncovered.  
The second step was to reveal strict tactical voting, i.e. voting for another party than one’s 
first party preference. In line with the reasoning on when to define a vote as tactical or not 
(sect. 3.1), voting for one of equally preferred parties was also included. Since tactical voting 
                                                          
6
 “Varför röstade du som du gjorde i riksdagsvalet?” Q2W38 
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is supposed to be something conscious, a subjective measurement of party preference was 
considered relevant.
7
 Most previous studies on the Swedish system compare the voter’s 
response on a question on what is his or her “best party” with the actual vote.8 Unfortunately, 
there was no “best party”-question in the 2010 Internet campaign panel. Instead there was a 
question on how much the voter likes a party on an 11 point feeling thermometer scale from 
(–5) to +5. The rating on the feeling thermometer was therefore used to reveal strict tactical 
voting.
9
 For all responses that were coded as tactical in the first step, party scores on the 
feeling thermometer were compared with the final vote.
10
 If the respondent voted for another 
party than the first party preference, or if preferences for the most preferred parties were tied 
(had been given the same score), the voting was coded as strict tactical.
11
 
To conclude, the first coding of an answer as tactical is rather inclusive, in line with the 
definition of tactical considerations. The coding of strict tactical voting is on the other hand 
more exclusive. Both codings are based on voters’ own motivations. What is investigated is 
whether the respondent said they let tactical considerations guide voting decision, and, for 
strict tactical voting, whether these considerations made the voter chose another party than the 
most or an equally preferred one. A reservation with this measurement is that motivations are 
not the same thing as real motives. The answers might for example have been influenced by 
what was seen as appropriate to express for the moment. In this specific election, it could for 
example have been seen as politically correct to express tactical motives. At the same time, if 
tactical voting was seen as appropriate, this could also have influenced voters’ actual 
behavior. It is also possible that some voters who did not mention tactical considerations in 
fact had tactical motives. If so, some tactical voters may have been included in the non-
tactical category. It is however very difficult to reveal voters’ “real” motives, since they may 
                                                          
7
 An alternative would have been to measure the voter’s “objective” party preference through for example his 
or her attitudes in certain ideological and/or performance-oriented issues. 
8
 See Gilljam and Holmberg (1993).  
9
 The feeling-thermometer could be argued to be more emotionally oriented than the “best party”-question. It 
is not certain that liking a party the most is the same thing as preferring it from an ideological or competence-
oriented point of view. The feeling thermometer is therefore a somewhat imprecise measurement of party 
preference. Still it was the best indicator of (subjective) party preference in this investigation. 
10
 Here final vote was considered a better measurement than vote intention a couple of days before the 
election (although some research shows that voters tend to over-report having voting for the winning party 
(Alvarez & Nagler 2000). It is possible that the voter changes vote intention during the last couple of days, 
especially if tactically oriented. Furthermore the response on actual vote was given the week directly after the 
election, which strengthens validity. 
11
 The feeling-thermometer question was only asked in the pre-elections stages of the Internet campaign panel. 
That means that the score on the sympathy-scale and vote were not measured simultaneously. The attitudes 
vis-à-vis parties (and the score on the feeling thermometer) might, for some voters, continue changing until the 
Election Day. However the voter’s general attitude towards the main parties during the election period should 
have been covered. 
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even be unconscious. At least the self-reported answers reveal what the voters themselves 
consider being important factors for vote choice.  
The answers on the reason to vote for a party-question were coded into four broad categories: 
short-term tactical, future oriented tactical, general tactical and non-tactical. The two broad 
tactical categories have been composed with Downs (1957) as the theoretical reference.  
4.4 Presence of tactical considerations 
Previous studies on the Swedish system have identified a couple of different sorts of tactical 
reasoning. Holmberg (1984:41) identifies three sorts of tactical voting: pass-the-threshold-
voting, voting for a party represented in the parliament (not to waste one’s vote) and voting 
for a large and strong party. In a precedent study Gilljam and Holmberg also discuss some 
future oriented tactical motives, related to sending an ideological direction. They label this 
kind of voting issue oriented tactical (saktaktisk) (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:291). All these 
tactical considerations are present in the Internet campaign panel material as well. 
Furthermore, there are tactical considerations related to outspoken party co-operation:  some 
voters argue to have voted for another party than the most preferred one, due to proposed 
government coalitions. There are also tactical motives related to increasing diversity of the 
party system. Both short-term and future oriented tactical thinking are thus present. The 
tactical answers are presented in these two broad categories, in line with Downs’s view of 
voters’ different time perspectives.  
4.4.1 Short-term tactical considerations 
The answers in this category have in common that they relate to the short term outcome of the 
election and the expected impact of certain parties. Within this category, five main types of 
answers were identified: voting for a party that is represented in the parliament (not to “waste 
one’s vote”), voting to support a strong governmental alternative, voting adjusted to present or 
probable government coalitions, voting for a large and strong party and voting to help a party 
pass the threshold to the parliament.  This category tactical voting could be seen as an 
extended version of Holmberg (1984); Holmberg does not discuss motives related to 
government coalitions. 
The first type of short term tactical considerations is related to voting for a party within the 
parliament, to make the vote count. This kind of voting is similar to tactical voting for big 
parties in plurality systems, “not to waste one’s vote”, and could be labeled impact-voting. If 
18 
 
there is a party that is very much disliked, there might be an extra incentive to do this. The 
following statement is an example: 
“I intended to vote for the Feminist Party12, but since the Sweden Democrats were so successful 
I wanted to give my vote to a party that is represented in the parliament.” 
The second type of short term tactical considerations is also related to the impact of the vote, 
but more outspokenly to government alternatives, and could therefore be called government-
voting. These kinds of considerations are related to supporting a governmental alternative that 
is considered to be strong, to hinder a disliked alternative from getting influence. The 
following answer expresses this: 
 
“I planned to vote for the Green Party, but I wanted the Bourgeois alliance to get the majority of 
seats, so that the Sweden Democrats would not come to hold the balance of parliamentary 
power
13.” 
 
In the cases mentioned above, the voters thus adjusted their votes according to a disliked 
alternative.  
 
The third variant of short term tactical considerations is also related to adjusting the vote 
according to present or expected political coalitions, and even more directly. If the voter does 
not like the favorite party’s coalition partners, he or she might choose another alternative. 
Since it has to do with ties between parties, it is labeled relationship-voting. The following 
statement exemplifies this: 
 
“[…] I would rather have voted for the Green Party, but not when a vote there is a vote for the 
Social Democrats and the Left Party.”  
 
The fourth type of short term tactical considerations is related to voting for a large party with 
good chances to become influential – big party-voting. In these motivations the party’s main 
opponent is sometimes mentioned: there are several voters who express they would like the 
Moderate Party to become larger than the Social Democrats, and vice versa. This voting thus 
                                                          
12
 Feministiskt Initiativ (FI) 
13
 vågmästarroll 
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has a strategic aspect related to main competitors. The following statements are examples of 
big-party voting: 
“I wanted the Moderate Party to outperform the Social Democrats. Otherwise I would have 
voted for the Liberal Party
14
” 
“First of all: I concluded I wanted to vote for the big left party” 
In the latter case, it is not evident that the tactical considerations made the voter switch vote 
intentions, but the answer indicates they may have functioned as a tie-breaker.
15
  
The fifth type of short term tactical considerations is voting to help a party pass the threshold, 
pass-the-threshold-voting. This kind of voting could both be related to supporting a 
governmental alternative, and a wish to see a certain ideological direction or greater diversity. 
In the latter cases, this kind of voting has future oriented elements (see below).  The following 
answer is an example of general pass-the-threshold-voting. 
 “I support-voted. To make them pass the 4 per cent threshold.”   
 
4.4.2 Future oriented tactical considerations 
This category includes answers related to sending a signal to a favorite party. Answers related 
to wanting a more diverse selection of parties are also included, in line with Downs’s theory 
on future oriented rational voting.   
 
The first variant of future oriented tactical motives is related to expressing a wished direction 
to a favorite party, a type of signaling-voting. The signaling-voting was sometimes difficult to 
distinguish from more general “protest” motives (with the society as a whole as the target, for 
example). This refined a criterion for signaling-voting to be related to the recent development 
of a favorite party, as well as a wished direction. The following answer was coded as tactical: 
 
                                                          
 
15 It is not obvious to include big-party voting within the definition of tactical considerations. Big party-voting 
could for example be related to prestige-thinking, rather than governmental outcome. The example above 
indicates that. Still it is clearly related to the party context and the relationships between parties, which 
constitute the prerequisites of government formation. Therefore big-party voting was seen as a tactical 
consideration.   
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“I wanted to punish the Liberal Party. I am dissatisfied with their proposals on burqua 
restrictions as well as language tests for immigrants. The Center Party is fair enough, with 
decent immigration politics.”  
 
The voter cited above is apparently dissatisfied with a favorite party’s handling of some 
integration related issues, and therefore choses another party with fair enough politics. This 
could be seen as a tactical, targeted signal of disaffection and an expression of wished 
direction. On the other hand, answers which express dissatisfaction more generally, without 
references to any party voted for previously, were coded as non-tactical. The following 
statement exemplifies this:  
“Because of failed integration.” 
 
The distinction between future oriented tactical considerations and general protest motives 
does thus depend on how specific the voter has been in his or her motivations and whether 
there are references to parties, both backwards (past development) and forward (wished 
direction). It is possible that some voters with unspecified protest motives in fact had tactical 
arguments. However, if the voter gives a more nuanced motivation, he or she should 
reasonably have more tactically oriented motives for party choice.  
 
The second variant of future oriented tactical considerations is voting to increase diversity in 
the party system, and could therefore be labeled diversity-voting. This type of answers 
includes those who explicitly say they want to vote for a smaller party, to have more 
alternatives in coming elections or to balance the party system. The following statement is an 
example: 
 
“I wanted to support a bourgeois government, but I think several parties enrich politics. So that 
the Moderate Party does not become too strong.” 
 
This is related to a more diverse selection of parties, and a more balanced governmental 
outcome. Therefore these kinds of considerations are seen as tactical. The categorization of 
future oriented tactical considerations could be seen as a refined version of the issue oriented 
tactical voting (saktaktik) discussed by Gilljam and Holmberg (1990; 1993). Gilljam and 
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Holmberg define issue oriented tactical voters as voters who want to see another political 
direction in a certain issue. In this thesis, to be coded as tactical it furthermore takes a 
negative reference to the development of a specific party or to diversity-oriented motives. 
 
If both short-term and future-oriented motives were mentioned, the answer was coded 
according to the most emphasized factor. 
 
 
4.4.3 General tactical considerations 
This category includes answers that mention “tactical” or “strategic” with no further 
explanation, for example: 
“strategy”
 16
 
 
4.4.4 Summary: tactical considerations 
The main kinds of tactical considerations related to tactical voting are summarized in the table 
below. 
 
Table 1 
Variants of tactical voting 
Short term Future oriented 
1. impact-voting 1. signaling-voting 
2. government-voting 2. diversity-voting 
3. relationship-voting  
4. big party-voting  
5. pass-the-threshold-voting  
 
 
                                                          
16 If a respondent with general tactical considerations had also answered question 7 in the same post-election 
stage (Do you remember your way of reasoning when you finally decided what party to vote for?) (“Kommer du 
ihåg hur du resonerade i det ögonblick då du fattade det slutgiltiga beslutet om hur du skulle rösta i 
riksdagsvalet?) and that answer clarified the tactical considerations, the answer was coded according to that 
motivation. 
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4.4.5 Non-tactical reasons 
The remaining answers, which expressed no party tactical motives, were categorized as non-
tactical. Two examples of non-tactical motives are the following answers: 
“For ideological reasons.” 
“The best choice for me.” 
In sum, there are thus four main voting reason categories: short-term tactical considerations, 
future oriented tactical considerations, general tactical considerations and non-tactical 
reasons.
17
 For detailed coding of tactical answers, see Appendix. 
5. Presence of tactical voting 
5.1 Presence of tactical categories 
1746 respondents answered the relevant open-ended question on reasons to vote for certain 
party.
18
 All answers were read repeatedly and coded into any of the broad voting reasons 
categories outlined above. 173 of the answers were identified as tactical, of which most were 
short-term tactical (Table 2). 
Table 2  
Presence of tactical categories 
Category N 
Short-term tactical 134 
Future oriented tactical 28 
General tactical 11 
Non-tactical 1556 
Missing 17 
Total 1746 
Data: Q2W38, 2010 Internet campaign panel, MOD  
The frequencies should be seen in relation to the material, and not as representative for the 
Swedish electorate. In the Internet campaign panel people with high education and high 
political interest are overrepresented, why tactical voting should be somewhat more 
                                                          
17 There is also a missing category, which includes respondents who answered they did not vote in the general 
election or whose answers did not relate to voting decision. 
18
 “Why did you vote the way you did in the general election?” (“Varför röstade du som du gjorde i 
riksdagsvalet?”) Q2 W38. The response rate was about 60 per cent if including all participants (14434) in the 
panel (2887 of these got the open-ended question Q2W38 on vote reason). The response rate would be higher 
if including only the active participants (Dahlberg et al. 2011). 
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widespread here (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:292). Therefore the percentage tactical responses 
is probably higher here than in the electorate as a whole.  
 
5.2 Presence of strict tactical voting  
As a second step voters’ scores on the party feeling thermometer were used to reveal strict 
tactical voting.
19
 980 respondents had complete values on the feeling thermometer, of which 
105 were tactical answers.  Of the short-term tactical answers, 87 per cent were coded as strict 
tactical, whereas 76 per cent of the future oriented tactical answers were coded as strict.
 20
 All 
general tactical answers were coded as strict (Table 3).  
Table 3  
Tactical considerations or strict tactical voting 
Tactical category N 
Short-term strict 66 
Short-term considerations 11 
Future oriented strict 16 
Future oriented considerations 5 
General strict 7 
General considerations 0 
Total 105 
Data: Q2W38 and feeling thermometer ratings weeks 34– 37, 2010 Internet campaign panel, MOD 
 
This implies that some tactical reasoning, especially future oriented, is incorporated in voters’ 
general attitudes towards parties, as van der Brug et al. (2007) suggest; some voters who have 
mentioned tactical oriented motives have voted for the party they like most. Still, most 
                                                          
19
 The feeling thermometer is based on the question: “This question concerns how much one like or dislikes a 
party. Where would you personally place the different parties on the following scale?”(Q28W34, Q33W35, 
Q33W36; Q80W37) Scale from (-5 )– (+5), where (-5) stands for “strongly dislike”, (0) for “indifferent” and (+5) 
for “like very much”. (Den här frågan gäller hur mycket man gillar respektive ogillar de politiska partierna. Var 
skulle du personligen vilja placera de olika partierna på nedanstående skala?) (-5) “ogillar starkt”, (0) “varken 
ogillar eller gillar”, (+5) “gillar starkt”.) All major parliamentary parties were evaluated, as well as the Sweden 
Democrats, the Pirate Party and the Feminist Party. If the respondent answered the question at several stages, 
the rating closest to the election was used.  
20
 To be coded as strict tactical, the voter must have mentioned tactical motives and have voted for another 
party than the one given the highest score on the feeling thermometer (se footnote 19), or have had tied first 
political preferences (two or more most preferred parties were given the same score). 
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answers (89) were coded as strict tactical, i.e. tactical aspects have been crucial for vote 
choice. In the strict coding of tactical voting the tactical considerations-answers were included 
in the non-tactical voting category (Table 4).  
Table 4 
Presence of strict tactical voting21 
Category N 
Strict tactical 89 
Non-tactical 891 
Total 980 
Data: Q2W38 and feeling thermometer ratings weeks 34– 37, 2010 Internet campaign panel, MOD  
 
6. Explaining the presence of tactical voting 
This part of the study aims at explaining the presence of tactical voting. The starting point is 
the rational voting theory of Downs (1957).  
6.1 Theoretical expectations 
According to Downs, tactical voters are pragmatic and see elections as a selection of 
government. They are outcome-oriented, thinking about the consequences of voting. 
Furthermore, tactical considerations are supposed to be more short-term and election specific 
than ideological attitudes. Tactical voters should therefore decide late what party to vote for, 
and might switch vote intentions during the election campaign.
22
  In a proportional 
representation system context, which is complicated from a strategic point of view, tactical 
voters should also be relatively aware of political matters.  
6.2 Logistic regression method 
To test the theoretical expectations of tactical voting, logistic regression analysis was used. 
This is a useful method in this case since the dependent variable tactical voting can be 
constructed as a dichotomous variable, distinguishing tactical answers from non-tactical 
answers. Logistic regression has many similarities with linear regression: it reveals significant 
relationships between variables and the signs of the coefficients are interpreted in the same 
                                                          
21
 The frequencies should not be seen as representative for the Swedish electorate, due to the composition of 
the Internet campaign panel. 
22
 If the tactical considerations are oriented towards the strength of the party the preferences might be more 
stable.  
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way as in linear regression (positive or negative relationship). However there is no 
measurement of explained variance such as the R²-value in the linear regression (Hamilton 
1992:233; Agresti 2002:226). Moreover, the logistic equation is non-linear and the beta-
values are associated with probabilities instead of linear effects. A useful way to compare the 
strength of effects in logistic regression is the Odds Ratio (OR). The odds ratio is an 
exponential function of the beta value, and reveals how much the odds change if the value of 
the variable increases or decreases one scale step (Hamilton 1992:231; Hosmer & Lemeshow 
2000:49). Other things being equal, the odds that an individual gets value 1 on the dependent 
variable are multiplied by the odds ratio.
23
 
For the regression analyses two dependent variables were created. The first variable 
distinguishes non-tactical motives from tactical considerations. The second distinguishes strict 
tactical voting from non-tactical voting. The first variable explains the presence of tactical 
considerations among voters, whereas the second explains the presence of strict tactical 
voting. The effects are supposed to be the same, though more pronounced for strict tactical 
voting.  
6.3 Independent variables 
Two main groups of independent variables were constructed in line with the theoretical 
expectations. The first group is related to hesitation about what party to choose and tactical 
considerations as a short term factor. The second group is related to political interest and 
awareness. Furthermore some relevant background factors are included. All variables are 
chosen in regard to factors previous research argues to be related to tactical voting.  
The indicators are based on voters’ self-reported answers in the Internet campaign panel. A 
reservation with this measurement is that it is not certain that these answers are valid 
indicators of the factors they are supposed to reveal. However, it is hard to find a more 
objective way of measuring hesitation-related factors, for example difficulties to decide what 
party to vote for (see below). This is related to a decision process, and in an election context 
such a process is difficult to reveal without voters’ own statements. This study furthermore 
benefits from the fact that most indicators are measured directly before or after the general 
election.  
                                                          
23 For dichotomous variables OR=  , where the constant e ≈2,718. To make the effects of multi-step variables 
comparable with dummies, the b-value could be multiplied with the number of scale steps; OR= 
                           (Hamilton 1992:231). 
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6.3.1 Hesitation  
In line with the ideas on tactical considerations as short term factor, three indicators of 
hesitation and late voting decision were included in the analysis. The first hesitation-indicator 
to test is number of parties in party consideration set the weeks before the election (discussion 
on party sets see e.g. Oscarsson & Holmberg 2008:160 and Steenbergen & Hangartner 2008). 
If choosing between two or more different parties at a late stage, the voter should be more 
sensitive to tactical considerations.
24
  To create this variable the following question was used: 
Which party or parties do you consider voting for in the general election? 
25
 
If the respondent considered voting for two parties or more during the three-week period 
directly before the election, preferences were considered as tied. If the respondent ticked only 
one party only during the same period, preferences were considered as clear.
26
 As a second 
step, voters who considered three or more parties the weeks before the election were 
distinguished from others. This is thus an even more pronounced indicator of hesitation 
between parties.
27
 
The second measurement of hesitation focuses on difficulties to arrive at a voting decision. 
This “hard to vote” -variable was operationalized with the following question 
How difficult or easy did you find it to decide what party to vote for in this year’s election? 28 
The answers distinguished those who found it very easy to vote from those who found it hard 
to choose a party to vote for.  
                                                          
24
 Or alternatively: tactical voters may wait longer before they decide what party to vote for.   
25
 “Vilket eller vilka partier överväger du att rösta på i riksdagsvalet 2010?” Q35W35, Q35W36, Q82W37  
26 The respondent could tick for any of the main parties or other parties. The ones who ticked for two 
alternatives or more were coded as 1 (tied preferences), whereas the ones who ticked for only one party was 
coded as 0 (clear preferences).  The responses on the consideration-question in weeks 35, 36 and 37 were 
combined into a single variable. It thus distinguishes those who have a clear party choice 1–3 weeks before the 
election from those who hesitate between two or more parties during the same period.  If the respondent 
answered the question on party consideration more than once, it is the answer closest to the election that is 
included. (This variable was technically constructed in SPSS 18.0 with some advice from Henrik Lindholm, 
Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg and Anders Sundell, Department of Political Science, 
University of Gothenburg.)  
27
 Questions and response alternatives see footnotes 26 and 27. Here, respondents who ticked three parties or 
more was coded as 1, others as 0.  
28
 “Hur lätt eller svårt tycker du att det var att bestämma dig för hur du skulle rösta i årets riksdagsval?” 
Q11W38. Those who answered “very easy” were coded as 0, “quite easy” 1, “quite difficult” 2, “very difficult” 3 
(“mycket lätt” 0; “ganska lätt” 1; “ganska svårt” 2; “mycket svårt” 3.) . 
27 
 
The third measurement of hesitation is late voting decision. In line with Downs’s theory, a 
wait-and-see-approach should be widespread among tactical voters. To reveal if tactical 
voters decide late what party to vote for, the following question in the post-election stage was 
used:  
When did you finally decide what party to vote for in this year’s general election? 29 
Here voters who said they decided the party choice on the Election Day or the last week 
before the election were distinguished from those who decided earlier.
30
 
31
 
6.3.2 Center-position 
A forth indicator of an in-between position between parties is center-position on the political 
left-right scale.
32
 At the one hand, a position near the center of the scale should make more 
room for tactical considerations: there are more alternatives for a voter in the center and 
tactical considerations may be a tiebreaker. At the other hand, the purpose of tactical voting in 
PR-system may also be to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament. Such 
considerations might be to the left as well as to the right. Therefore impact of center-position 
is uncertain. 
6.3.3 Political sophistication 
Political sophistication means that the voter is interested in and well aware about political 
matters (see e.g. van der Brug et al. 2007:127). Tactical voting in PR-systems is supposed to 
be related to such knowledge, since the party system is complicated from a strategic point of 
view. To reveal political sophistication three measurements were used: level of education
33
; 
                                                          
29
 “När bestämde du dig för vilket parti du skulle rösta på I årets riksdagsval?” Q6W38. Those who answered 
they decided what party to vote for at the polling station, on the Election day or the last week before the 
election were coded as 1, those who said they made the decision earlier in the autumn or had decided since 
long were coded as 0. 
30 Some research suggests that voters tend to say they decided what party to vote for later than they in fact did 
(Oscarsson & Dahlberg 2009). This self-reporting bias should though be evenly spread among voters, why the 
general effect should be valid. 
31
 It would also have been relevant to include a measurement of party-identification. However, a question on 
party-identifications was only given to a small number of respondents in the panel.  
32
 To create this variable, answers from the recruitment questionnaire to the 2010 Internet campaign panel 
were used (Q28). There all respondents were asked to place themselves on a political left-right-scale from 0 –
10. Those who placed themselves at position 4, 5 or 6 were coded as center-position (1), others as 0.  
33
 This variable was created using Q26 on highest education level in the e-panel recruitment questionnaire. 
Those who answered primary school (grundskola; categories 1+2)were coded as 0, secondary school/high 
school (gymnasium; categories 3+4) were coded as 1, some kind of higher education (eftergymnasial; 
categories 5+6) were coded as 3, and higher education degree or doctoral degree (categories 7+8) were coded 
28 
 
political interest
34
 and factual political knowledge.
 3536
 A high level of education should make 
the voter more cognitively skilled in general. Political interest should encourage the voter to 
discuss and calculate about the election. Sophisticated voters should also have a high degree 
of factual political knowledge: this kind of knowledge reveals that the voter is informed and 
well aware of politics in the specific context.  
6.3.4 Age and gender  
The background factors age
37
 and gender
38
 are also included in the analysis. Age is supposed 
to be slightly negatively related to tactical voting in general. During the last decades the party 
political identities have become less clear (Dalton 2008; van der Eijk & Franklin 2009). 
Younger cohorts may therefore use tactical considerations more than older people. Gender is 
included as a control variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
as 4. Some veterans in the panels did not answer this question in the 2010-panel, but in the 2006 general 
election e-panel. These answers were also included.  
34
 Political interest was measured using the question: “How interested are you in politics in general?” (“Hur 
intresserad är du i allmänhet av politik?”) (Q24W38).  The answers “not at all interested” and “not very 
interested” were coded as 0, “quite interested” as 1 and “very interested” as 2. (“inte alls intresserad” och 
“inte särskilt intresserad” 0; ganska intresserad 1; mycket intresserad 2.) 
35
 To reveal political knowledge question 36:1-9 in week 36 was used “What parties do the following politicians 
belong to?”. (“Vilka partier tillhör följande personer?”)The respondent had to name the party affiliation for 
some more or less well known politicians: Anders Borg (m), Fredrik Federley (c), Birgitta Olsson (fp), Gunilla 
Carlsson (m), Leif Pagrotsky (s), Mikaela Valtersson (mp), Alice Åström (vp), Mats Odell (kd) and Tomas Östros 
(s). Those who got all candidates right were coded as 2, those who got 1 –2 mistakes as 1, others as 0.   
36
 In the multivariate analyses the political knowledge and political interest variables were collapsed into the 
variable political awareness. Questions and codings, see footnotes 34 and 35. The collapsed variable political 
awareness gives equal weight to the interest and knowledge measurements, giving a variable ranging from 0–
4.  
37
 Age was measured using the birth year values in the recruitment questionnaire (Q3). Those who were born 
1988–1992 were coded 0, 1983–1987 1; 1978–1982 2; 1973–1977 3; 1968–1972 4; 1963–1967 5; 1958–1962 6; 
1953–1957 7; 1948–1952 8; 1943–1947 9; 1938–1942 10; 1933–1937 11; 1926–1932 12. Some veterans who 
participated in the 2006 panel did not answer the birth year question 2010. For these respondents the values 
from the 2006 panel were included.  
38
 The gender variable was created using question 2 in the recruitment stage: “Are you a woman or a man?” (Är 
du kvinna eller man?”)  Woman was coded as 0, man as 1. For some veterans, answers from the 2006 panel 
were included (see footnote 33). 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Bivariate analyses 
All independent variables were first tested in bivariate logistic regression analyses (Tables 5 
and 6). The effect of the first hesitation indicator, tied preferences, is significantly related to 
tactical voting, as expected. Also the more pronounced measurement of hesitation, three or 
more parties in consideration set, is related to tactical voting. This confirms the expectation 
that tactical voting is related to considering several parties at a late stage. The second 
hesitation variable, difficult to decide what party to vote for, is also significantly related to 
tactical voting. In line with previous results, the third hesitation indicator, late voting decision, 
also has a significant effect on tactical voting.  
The hesitation variable having the strongest impact is tied preferences, with the odds ratio 5.
39
 
 
That means that the odds to be a tactical voter are five times higher for a person with tied 
preferences than for a person with stable party preferences, other things being equal.  
Of the sophistication-related variables, education has a significant relationship to tactical 
voting. Age is also related to tactical voting: young people tend to vote tactically to a higher 
degree than older ones.
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 For dichotomous variables the odds ratio (OR)=  (e≈2,718). Here OR=          = 4,8 (b-value from tied 
preferences Table 4). 
40
 The relationships between age and tactical considerations and strict tactical voting are significant and similar 
when using a strict coding of age (one year=one scale step) instead of age groups. In this investigation there are 
however very few very old respondents, why the division in somewhat broader age groups was considered 
relevant.  
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Table 5 
Bivariate logistic regression analyses of the relationship between hesitation, political 
sophistication and tactical considerations  
 
 tactical considerations OR
41
 N 
tied preferences (0-1) +1,574*** (0,284) 4,8 860 
several preferences (0-1) +1,089*** (0,224) 3,0 860 
difficult decide (0-3) +0,450*** (0,125) 3,9 842 
late decision (0-1) +1,292*** (0,165) 3,6 1719 
center-position (0-1) +0,120 (0,204)  1417 
education (0-4) +0,231* (0,101) 2,5 1653 
political interest (0-2) +0,074 (0,125)  1707 
political knowledge (0-2) +0,040 (0,108)  1367 
age (0-12) –0,120*** (0,033) 4,2 1413 
gender (0-1) –0,014 (0,168)  1650 
Note: The dependent variable tactical considerations is coded 1 for respondents who mentioned tactical reasons 
as motive for vote choice, 0 for non-tactical answers. Standard-errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed 
using SPSS version 18.0. * p< .05 **p<0.01 ***p< .001 
Data: The 2006 & 2010 Internet campaign panels (E-panelen), MOD, University of Gothenburg 2010 
 
As expected, the effects of hesitation, education and age are somewhat stronger on strict 
tactical voting (Table 6). Especially the effect of education is more pronounced. This indicates 
that political sophistication is somewhat more related to strict tactical voting than to tactical 
considerations in general. Also the effect of age is stronger. The odds ratio for the extreme 
values is 6, which means that the odds to vote strict tactically are six times higher for a 20-
year-old than for an 80-year-old person, other things being equal.
42
  
                                                          
41
 OR = odds ratio. For dichotomous variables OR=   (e≈2,718). For multi-step variables the b-values are 
multiplied with the number of scale steps: OR=                            (Hamilton 1992:231). All odds ratios 
are calculated with positive beta-values, to make the effects more intuitively comparable. 
 
42
 OR=                           =            = 5,7 (beta-value for age from Table 6.). The sign of the beta-value is 
here given positive sign since this makes the OR more intuitively interpretable. The negative sign means that 
the chances to be a strict tactical voter decrease with age. The chances that an 80-year old is a tactical voter 
are six times lower than for a 20-year-old. Division in age groups (0-12), see footnote 37. 
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Table 6 
Bivariate logistic regression analyses of the relationship between hesitation, political 
sophistication and strict tactical voting 
 
 strict tactical voting OR
43
 N 
tied preferences (0-1) +1,643*** (0,423) 5,2 453 
several preferences (0-1) +1,121*** (0,320) 3,1 453 
difficult decide (0-3) +0,490** (0,171) 4,3 474 
late decision (0-1) +1,355*** (0,227) 3,9 977 
center-position (0-1) +0,093 (0,292)  798 
education (0-4) +0,455** (0,153) 6,2 939 
political interest (0-2) +0,154 (0,177)  968 
political knowledge (0-2) +0,125 (0,143)  863 
age (0-12) –0,145** (0,046) 5,7 793 
gender (0-1) –0,323 (0,226)  942 
Note: The dependent variable strict tactical voting is coded 1 for respondents who mentioned tactical reasons as 
motive for vote choice and voted for another party than the most preferred or an equally preferred party, 0 for all 
other voters. Standard-errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using SPSS version 18.0. * p< .05 
**p<0.01 ***p< .001 
Data: The 2006 & 2010 Internet campaign panels (E-panelen), MOD, University of Gothenburg 2010 
 
The results above show that all hesitation-related variables have a considerable impact on 
tactical voting. This confirms the expectation that tactical considerations are short term and 
election specific.  
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 Formula see footnote 41. 
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Linear regression analyses show that these variables are strongly inter-related.
44
 Several 
parties in consideration set, as well as difficulties to decide what party to vote for, could be 
supposed to be precedent variables to late voting decision:  
 
several parties in consideration set → late voting decision 
                ↕ 
difficulties to decide → late voting decision  
 
Age is also significantly related to all hesitation-variables. The relationship between age and 
tied preferences is the strongest.
45
 This implies that age is a precedent variable to hesitation 
about what party to choose, which in turn is related to tactical voting: 
young age → hesitation→ tactical voting 
 
6.4.2 Multivariate analyses 
To reveal possible interaction-effects, the relationships were also tested in multivariate 
analyses. Here late voting decision was chosen as the indicator of tactical considerations as 
short term factor, to avoid problems with multicollinearity and get a decent number of valid 
responses.
46
 Furthermore political interest and political knowledge were collapsed into the 
single variable political awareness, since these factors are also inter-related.
47
  
In the multivariate analyses the general patterns remain, but some new tendencies appear 
(Table 7). First of all, political awareness is here significantly related to strict tactical voting.
 
This implies that if a voter who hesitates between different parties is also politically 
sophisticated, tactical aspects tend to be relatively influential for the voter to arrive at a final 
                                                          
44
 Difficulties to decide and late voting decision have the strongest interrelationship (R²= 0,37). 
45
 R² = 0.02; p<0.001. In this linear regression analysis age was seen as the dependent variable since tied 
preferences is a dichotomous variable and cannot be used as the dependent variable in a linear regression 
(unless the independent variable also is a dichotomous variable).  
46
 This resulted in 105 tactical respondents in the multivariate tactical considerations-analysis, and 59 strict 
tactical respondents in the multivariate strict tactical analysis. If any of the other hesitation variables had been 
chosen the sample would have been half as large, and have given less statistically reliable results.  
47
 Political interest and knowledge are given the same weight in the collapsed variable. The collapsed variable 
has therefore 4 scale steps (instead of 2 for each of the separate variables).  
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voting decision.
48
 This result confirms that political sophistication is somewhat related to 
tactical voting. On the other hand, the significant relationship between education and strict 
tactical voting disappears in the multivariate analyses. This could be due to the fact that 
education is significantly related to all other independent variables except center-position and 
to the reduced sample.
49
 The significant effect of young age remains and is stronger for strict 
tactical voting.  
 
Table 7 
Multivariate logistic regression analyses of the relationship between hesitation, political 
sophistication and tactical voting 
 
 tactical considerations OR
50
 strict tactical voting OR 
late decision (0-1) +1,029*** (0,217) 2,8 +1,104*** (0,291) 3,0 
center-position (0-1) +0,097 (0,239)  +0,090 (0,328)  
education (0-4) +0,117 (0,133)  +0,198 (0,186)  
political awareness (0-4) +0,107 (0,089)  +0,280* (0,124) 3,1 
age (0-12) –0,113** (0,040) 3,9 –0,137* (0,054) 5,2 
gender (0-1) 0,237 (0,224)  –0,361 (0,290)  
constant –2,728*** (0,437)  –3,002*** (0,591)  
N 1080  677  
Note: The dependent variable tactical considerations is coded 1 for respondents who mentioned tactical reasons 
as motive for vote choice, 0 for non-tactical answers. The dependent variable strict tactical voting is coded 1 for 
respondents who mentioned tactical reasons as motive for vote choice and voted for another party than the most 
preferred or an equally preferred party, 0 for all other voters. Standard-errors are in parentheses.  Estimations 
performed using SPSS version 18.0. * p< .05 **p<0.01 ***p< .001 
Data: The 2006 & 2010 Internet campaign panels (E-panelen), MOD, University of Gothenburg 2010 
 
 
 
                                                          
48
 For less sophisticated voters with tied preferences, factors as specific candidates, trends or random could be 
supposed to be more influential.  
49
 Regression analysis shows for example that there is a positive significant relationship between education and 
late voting decision. The reduced sample may have weakened the effect of education since some tactical voters 
with high education may not have been given or answered all variable related questions, and have therefore 
been excluded from the multivariate analyses.  
50
 Formula see footnote 41. 
34 
 
6.4.3 Summary of results 
The results confirm the expectation that tactical voters consider voting for different parties 
and wait long before they make their final choice.  Young age is also related to tactical voting. 
This indicates that younger people use tactical considerations to a higher extent than older 
ones. Furthermore there is a relationship between political sophistication and tactical voting. 
If a young voter who hesitates between different parties is also very aware of political matters, 
the chances increases that the he or she votes tactically. 
 
7. Conclusions  
Tactical voters have in common that the take the governmental outcome into account when 
deciding what party to vote for. This thesis shows that Downs’s (1957) theory on rational 
voting can be applied on a contemporary PR-context. Thinking and calculating about the 
governmental outcome are present also here. There are many different ways of reasoning 
tactically. There are considerations related to political coalitions, the size of the party, the 
party’s ideological development or diversity of the party system. The two latter incentives 
could be seen as future oriented and are not obviously tactical. The definition of future 
oriented tactical considerations has been much elaborated in this study. One conclusion is that 
protest-voting against the society as a whole should not be regarded as tactical. To be 
considered as tactical, it takes more party-specified motives and an expressed wished 
direction.  
The theoretical expectation that tactical voting is related to considering different parties at a 
late stage was greatly confirmed. In line with expectations, tactical considerations thus seem 
to functions as a short term tie-breaker: 
hesitation→ tactical considerations (tactics as tie-breaker) (1) 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that tactically oriented voters in general have a wait 
and see-approach; they await the development of the political arena before they decide what 
party to vote for. From this perspective it is a tactical mentality rather than uncertainty that 
explains the relationship between hesitation and tactical voting. According to this 
interpretation, the causal direction is reversed: 
tactical considerations → hesitation (wait-and-see-approach) (2) 
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It is though reasonable to see tactical voting as the result of both these dynamics. The tactical 
voter may both be tied between different parties and play a waiting game: 
3) hesitation ↔ tactical considerations (tactical dynamics) (3) 
To see if tactical voting is above all the result of a conscious wait and see approach, or 
genuine uncertainty about party choice, would require further research. It would for example 
be possible to use more specified surveys or in-depth interviews to reveal tactical voters 
reasoning.  
Tactical voting also seems to be related to young age. This confirms the expectation that 
younger cohorts use tactical considerations to a stronger degree than older ones. There are a 
couple of possible explanations. First of all, young people are in general less tied to parties. 
Therefore they hesitate more between alternatives, and become more sensitive to tactical 
considerations – as the perspective “tactics as tie-breaker” (1) suggests. On the other hand, 
young voters may in general have a more instrumentally oriented mentality than older people. 
This could be argued to be associated with the other tactical dynamic outlined above: playing 
a waiting game (2). These tendencies could also be combined, as the third perspective tactical 
dynamics suggests. 
Moreover, voting trends could influence young people more than older ones. In this particular 
election, there was a quite lively public discussion on voting tactically. This could have 
influenced young voters’ final vote decision more than older people’s vote choice. To see if 
the relationship between young age and tactical voting holds for other elections, it should be 
tested in future research. 
 
8. Discussion 
Tactical voting is rational in the sense that the voter thinks one step further: about the 
governmental consequences of voting.  As governments are central actors in society, Downs’s 
view of rational voting as selections of governments is relevant. Therefore clear government 
alternatives could be seen as beneficial, since it makes it easier for voters to consider the 
outcome of elections. On the other hand, if having a broader view of political society than 
formation of governments, Downs’s theory of rational voting is too restrictive. A voter might 
in fact find it more important to express a belonging or strengthen non-governmental 
channels, than to affect the selection of government. Then such voting could be rational for 
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the specific voter. Downs’s voting theory, with exclusive focus on voting as selection of 
government, is therefore a somewhat limited notion of voting rationality. 
Downs also has difficulties to integrate future oriented rational voting in the analysis. In the 
chapter on voting under coalition governments, the future oriented rational voter is regarded 
as an exception, and is not included in the general analysis (Downs 1957:145). There is thus 
ambiguity in the handling of future oriented rationality. Short-term rationality is obviously 
easier to grasp.  
Downs’s notion of voting rationality clearly has limitations. Still it is relevant, and apparently 
present among voters. This study shows that tactical reasoning is especially common among 
young people with loose ties to the parties. Therefore tactical considerations may become 
more pronounced in the future. What would be the systemic consequences of a higher degree 
of tactical voting are not evident. It could lead to political stability, if the voter adjusts the 
vote according to proposed parliamentary alternatives. If voters on the other hand are more 
guided by future oriented tactical considerations, the party system might become less stable. 
This could make it harder for governments to implement and legitimize political reforms. At 
the same time, future oriented tactical voting could be seen as a (positive) democratic control 
mechanism.  
This study applied Downs’s view of rational voting (1957) on a contemporary PR-electoral 
context. Downs’s reasoning was found to be relevant. The study defined tactical voting as 
voting taking governmental consequences into account and let this decide vote choice. 
Tactical considerations could be both short term, focusing on the next-coming formation of 
government, and future oriented. The inclusion of future oriented tactical motives should be 
further elaborated in future research.  
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Appendix 
Coding of tactical considerations 
Short term tactical  
vote  
- for a party represented in the parliament to make the vote count, e.g. 
to hinder a disliked party/government alternative from getting influence (impact-voting) 
- for a governmental alternative that is considered to be strong ,e.g. to hinder a disliked 
alternative (government-voting) 
- adjusted to present or probable governmental coalitions (relationship-voting) 
- for a large party considered to be influential (big party-voting) 
- to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament  (pass-the-threshold-voting) 
 
Future oriented tactical  
vote to 
- signal an ideological direction to a favorite party, to protest against its recent development 
(signaling-voting) 
- support a small party with chances to improve,  to increase diversity (diversity-voting) 
To be included in the expressive tactical category the answer also has to either include the 
word 
1) “tactical” or “strategic” 
or  
2) have a reference to 
-  a negative development of a party that has been voted for in recent elections 
- the importance of diversity in the party system 
 
General tactical  
“tactical” or “strategic” is mentioned without further explanation, 
such as  
“strategy” 
 
